INTRODUCTION
Scale and territory as a couplet have a curious history in Anglophone human geography. They seem to have marched in tandem with changing awareness of globalization. The most recent interest is undoubtedly connected to the widespread publicity afforded the growth of trade and international investment in the world since the 1970s. There was an earlier phase associated with the first globalization that came to a halt with the First World War. This is the classical geopolitics of Mackinder and Bowman (Cox 2013.) But then there was silence. As countries closed in on themselves, geographers seemed to lose interest in the topics. Earlier, power and space had been taken for granted. Later when the connection was rediscovered, it would be different. Human geography lost its innocence in a welter of self-questioning. This, of course, is to talk about globalization in an absolute sense. It is useful here, though, to think of it in relative terms: not of the local and the global, therefore, but of the more local and the more global, which is the meaning that seems to have caught on, if without explicit acknowledgement.

Since the 70s, writing on the topic of scale and, often derivatively, if not explicitly, territory, has flourished. It has become a central preoccupation. It has also become a matter of some controversy. Clearing away the underbrush and identifying some stable mooring posts through which to navigate the topic therefore seems in order. The chapter commences with an historical résumé before moving on to the recent debates that scale and territory and their mutual imbrication have incited. This then paves the way for a discussion of some complementary windows on the topic with a view to deepening our understanding.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The idea of scale has a long history in human geography; the idea of territory, less so, at least in terms that are explicit. Once territory made a serious appearance and its determinant conditions understood, then the connection with scale was not far behind. By the last two decades of the twentieth century, the basic lineaments of a theorization of scale and territory were clear. This was a materialist understanding that saw geographic scales in relational terms – the global included in the local and the local in the global – and the tensions between them inherent in the contradiction between fixity and mobility that generated territoriality. Scale would assume institutional forms: multinationals, international currency exchange regimes, the scale divisions of labor of firms, state hierarchies. There would be scalar relations like those between neighborhood organizations and city hall, and supplicant countries and the IMF. In other words, the connection forged between territory and scale took off from a recognition that questions of power could not be expunged from understanding in human geography. As the posts asserted themselves in human geography, this was a view of scale and territory that would be challenged.

Geographic scale has a long history in the field. It was at least implicit in country-studies where internal differentiation was handled by breaking the country down into regions. Regions would be divided into sub-regions and sub-regions divided still further (Haggett 1963: 263-264.) This would be the basis for the insight that the different conditions of variation over space had appropriately different scales of operation; climate operated at a different level than, say, soil type (for example, Bird 1956.)
The spatial-quantitative work of the 1960s gave precision to the idea of scalar variation (Haggett 1963: 265-269.) Variance decomposition methods could then be, and were used to show how the total variation of, say population density, could be broken down into percentage ‘contributions’ from county, state or region level (Moellering and Tobler 1972.) This was and remains particularly useful where there is a strong theory regarding the distribution of the variance (for example, Stokes 1965.) But while there was advance in terms of precision, and that precision in turn raised important theoretical questions regarding scale, as in how scale entered into different location decisions, there were serious limitations. For with respect to questions of power, and since Mackinder and Bowman and the hey-day of classical geopolitics, human geography had shown a remarkable insouciance. Only with the critique of the spatial-quantitative work that took off after 1970 would this begin to change. The most analytically penetrating work of that period was Marxist. It should be no surprise, therefore, that a contribution heralding change in how geographic scale was viewed would come from that direction. This was Peter Taylor’s paper of 1981, ‘A Materialist Framework for Political Geography,’ which from the standpoint of scale was utterly revolutionary in how it viewed the question: a move away from the relative concepts of space that had dominated hitherto – a concern with the effects of scale as area or distance – to a more relational one; and a recognition of the central importance of social process. Taylor’s contribution had two points of departure. The first was Wallerstein’s world systems theory, which in turn reflected the interest in Marxist geography initiated at the beginning of the seventies. The choice of Wallerstein is highly significant since it represented recognition of the centrality of the global scale to what transpired at other scales, including that of the state which had, up to that point, been so prominent in the work of political geographers. The second condition for his intervention was the way in which political geographers had tended to organize their writings around three particular geographic scales: the global, the national and the urban. From this followed his suggestion that ‘the threefold arrangement has an important general function within modern capitalism’ and that ‘We need a political economy of scale to unravel this situation.’

This is the background to his positing of relations between these scales starting with that of the world economy. He defined this as the scale of reality: ‘real’ because this is the scale at which accumulation and therefore production is organized, reflecting the Marxist priority accorded to the latter. The urban, on the other hand, is the scale at which accumulation is experienced since this is where people live their daily lives. So accumulation is experienced in the form of what people have to spend, whether or not they will be able to find work, pay the mortgage and the like. Finally, the national is the scale of ideology. This is the scale at which interpretations of experience at the urban level are dispensed, in nationalistic forms, for example, all with a view to justifying subordination to the accumulation process which is going on at the global scale.

Taylor’s paper represented a major step forward in how geographers viewed geographic scale. Scale and scalar relations were conditioned by social organization. But for a view inscribed in a thoroughly relational view of space it was not quite there. This is because there is a functionalism about his argument that obscures the way in which scales and scalar relations are constructed: how they don’t just come about because they happen to work but because people set about producing them and making them work; and they do this in virtue of particular sets of social relations like those defined by Wallerstein’s world system. In addition the close relation with territory now common in discussions of scale was absent and there are good reasons for this. Taylor’s intellectual pedigree had been the world systems school of Marxism. This emphasized the sphere of circulation. Arriving at a materialist understanding of territory would require something different; the subordination of circulation to production that is the hallmark of classical Marxism. This would be the contribution of David Harvey in his 1985 paper, ‘The Geopolitics of Capitalism.’

While it is unclear what influence Harvey had on it, by the 1990s there was certainly a common
understanding of scale and territory and their mutual relationship. This emphasized relations of a vertical sort between higher and lower levels and a nested relation of differently scaled spaces. The way the state was organized territorially gave this idea concrete shape, as did the then current imaginary of relations between the global and the local. There may also have been some tendency, if only implicit, to put higher levels in a determinant role. This was a view that would then be subject to critique.

DEBATES
In the first decade of the new century there was a flurry of critical scrutiny, even attack. Papers by Amin (2002), Marston, Jones and Woodward (2005), and Allen both on his own (2010) and with Cochrane (2007; 2012) have been prominent. There are some common themes. They also seem to owe a lot in their understanding of the scale issue to Massey’s work: in particular her view of how the construction of places is conditioned by the chance juxtaposition of a more extensive geography – actually historical geography - of relations (1999; 2005). A major focus of criticism has been the hierarchical understanding of scale: how scales are supposedly ordered in subordinate-dominant relations as in that between the local and the global or between local government and central government. A related one has been the territorial emphasis of scalar thinking. The power of the network then becomes the central consideration in destabilizing notions of scale and territory.

Scalar thinking is to emphasize vertical relations. The image of nested agencies of the state at different levels with those at higher levels constraining, even determining, what those at lower levels do is a common one. The contrast is with the horizontality of networks which interfere with top-down determination, opening up the possibility of resolutions of a more contingent, open character. Verticality also implies a very centered view of the world: the upper levels of the state are where the important things happen and decisions are then dispersed to lower levels. Networks, rather, are seen as a vehicle for the decentralization of decision making; more democratic therefore. Similar arguments are made in the case of globalization and its politics of scale.

As far as the territorial frame of scalar thinking is concerned, networks, implicitly defined as horizontal, are seen as an agent of de-territorialization: as facilitating the dissolution of local attachments, the intimate local connections that firms often enter into and other forms of local or place dependence (Amin 2002). Territorial action, exclusion, inclusion, locally-focused forms of development therefore dissolve away as dependence on the local, material and affective, is loosened. Firms become multinational; labor markets, at least for some, become continental, even of global proportions. Castells’ space of flows (1983) is the most reductive of these arguments. In turn they have led to new claims about the relation between space and place: how place as a horizon of action in people’s lives is being undermined by space.

Much of this critical literature has drawn impetus from post-structural and post-modern forms of thinking and this, as such, represents a rejection of the sort of political economy embraced by historical materialists. Scalar thinking is now seen as a particular form of discourse: a discourse for some and to the disadvantage of many; as a positioning for some sort of leverage. It is not, in other words, the way in which capitalist states, in virtue of the limits and possibilities of the capitalist space economy have to be organized. So too is it with territory. As Allen and Cochrane remark, “It would seem that the language of territorial politics is not only stubborn, but equally that it cannot simply be wished away by some conceptual wand, since it is itself a powerful political construction. Assemblies, regional development agencies, and the like, are performed as territorial entities that try to hold down the fluid elements of global life in the general interest of their ‘regions’ – seeking to generate fixity through ‘processes of government and governance’” (2007: 1162-63).

As I have argued elsewhere, I believe these claims to be quite mistaken (see Cox 2013.) Hierarchy is swept away in favor of networks; the vertical in favor of the horizontal. Necessity of a structural sort is replaced lock stock and barrel by contingency. But in a world where the domination of a particular social relation, that of capital is so
evident, and to which the mass of the population is subordinated, and whose subordination has to be reproduced, this cannot be. If the critics had a point, it was that understandings of scale had hitherto been insufficiently relational. But to then argue that relationality was confined to the horizontal was a step too far. How therefore might we understand scale and territory in their mutual relations? It is to that question that we now turn by adumbrating some principles. These start, logically enough, with a brief discussion of social foundations.

SOME PRINCIPLES
1. THE CAPITALIST FORM OF DEVELOPMENT
In any discussion of scale and territory in the contemporary world, the capitalist form of development and its logics, including its spatial logics, has to be the point of departure. Fundamentally capitalism is a class relation: a relation between those who have the money to put the production process in motion by buying the necessary means of production and hiring the workers; and the vast majority comprising those who, stripped of the means of production, have to make themselves available for hire. It is also a contradictory relation, impelling capital to accumulate and, towards that end, to utterly revolutionize society in all its different aspects. This is mentioned at the outset since in many discussions of scale, particularly as they touch on globalization, it is competition rather than class that receives emphasis. This is mistaken. Competition cannot be treated as a deus ex machina. It, and its dominant form of competing in the form of costs of production is conditional on a very particular class relation. The drive to accumulate is crucial for everything else that happens but it is founded first and foremost on the confrontation between those with the money to buy the conditions of production and those without.1

2. SPACES OF CIRCULATION AND INSTITUTIONS
The historically unprecedented way in which capital has been able to develop the productive forces is registered by remarkable increases in the productivity of workers. Central to this has been the way in which production has been progressively socialized: the way, that is, in which production by individuals with limited forms of cooperation with others, producing for themselves, has given way to an all-round dependence of one worker on another. One key to this has been the development of the division of labor: between firms, between regions and so on. A second aspect of the socialization of production has then been the use of means of production in common: steel mills, container ports, assembly lines, railroad networks and cities with their shared physical and social infrastructures.

In consequence, the socialization of production assumes a geographic form in what might be called a space of circulation, albeit one where circulation is a moment of the production process. This is inevitably characterized by a certain geographic scale – urban, regional, national, for example – within which commodities, at various stages of their production circulate. The division of labor acquires a spatial form: a geographic division of labor as different places specialize in different products or perform different functions in a single labor process – from component producers to assemblers along with auxiliary functions like the headquarters one and research and development. Means of production-in-common, like railroads and highway networks, then facilitate this space of circulation.

Spaces of circulation have to be regulated: scale in the sense in which the idea is being developed here, always assumes institutional forms. We know that a metropolitan area has emerged as a unity of production and circulation when new, coordinating institutions, like regional chambers of commerce, public transit authorities, regional planning organizations and the like take shape. But this then raises the question of regulation (and implicitly of scale) for whom? In light of recent claims about globalization as a sphere of unfettered competition, this merits emphasis as we will see.

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1 Significantly this is the approach adopted in Capital Volume I: Marx proceeds as if competition did not exist. See also John Weeks (1981: Chapter 6.)
3. SCALAR DIFFERENTIATION AND TERRITORY
The recent talk has been of globalization. But as long as capital has existed it has been constructing more extensive spaces of circulation; new relations between more local configurations of activity and more global ones. New, more extended geographic divisions of labor emerge alongside the old, which then get transformed in their turn. Likewise, there have been new forms of agglomeration – new shared means-of-production, in other words – with their own transformed geographic divisions of labor: back offices and office parks in the suburbs, and a post-industrial downtown.

Alongside these developments there are new institutional dispensations; new regulatory practices, partly state initiatives, partly those of private agents, firms, labor movements, and often meshing in various ways – new distributions of powers and responsibilities creating new structures of governance. These institutional forms bear emphasis; arguments about globalization and tensions with those who are dependent on structures of relations at smaller geographic scales, often proceed as if the global is a sphere of unfettered market relations; an image of capital and commodities moving from country to country in an unregulated manner and challenging the reproduction of regulated spheres at national scales, as with labor laws; a sphere beyond human intervention, that is. But this is clearly incorrect. The more global is always a sphere of regulation: the Bretton Woods agreements were an obvious case in point, but while they disintegrated in the early ’70s, what succeeded them was far from an institutional void. There have always been mutually agreed-on ways of regulating international currency exchange going back to the gold standard to the current accepted practices of allowing values to be determined by forces of supply and demand or pegging them to that of a major international currency like that of the dollar. One could also argue that debate about capital controls has never gone away. One can certainly complain about the details of the regulations and the fact that they are always for some and not others, but to claim a sphere of market activity that is entirely lacking in any social constitution is absurd. Scalar relations are always about institutions and intervening in them. It is this that allows us to talk about a politics of scale. But this in turn is predicated on the idea of territory.

For as the new emerges alongside the old, the contradictions of capitalist development assume a geographic form: tensions between the more local and the more global, as David Harvey (1985) has made so clear. It is out of this tension that ideas of territory emerge. Production requires fixity in the form of physical and social infrastructures, including those of the individual firm. But accumulation also requires that the value extracted at a particular place be free to be laid out for the conditions of production regardless of location. The result is that value may no longer flow through those infrastructures threatening the amortization of investments in industrial plant, airports and the like; while removing the advantages of a particular ensemble of localized social relations. Labor faces its own challenges; certainly those of home ownership and the devaluation that can result as a local economic base implodes, but also the increasing irrelevance of local connections, with friends and kin, to finding work.

The upshot, as David Harvey has emphasized, has been the emergence of coalitions of forces behind attempts to protect and enhance values in place; to meet the challenges to ‘our city, our country, the West Midlands, etc.’ In other words a discourse of territory can emerge in the context of plans to recapitalize, to refinance, and to restructure the local / regional / national economy, or whatever. And I use the word ‘discourse’ deliberately since the term can conceal more than it reveals and often quite intentionally. Interests get defined territorially, bringing different class forces behind a common banner. This can then lay the foundation for a distinct politics of scale.

4. SCALE, TERRITORY AND GEOGRAPHICALLY UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT
Differentially scaled institutional regimes create opportunity structures for territorially defined interests. This is a condition for a politics of scale that is widely acknowledged as in practices of scale ‘jumping’ (Cox 1998). But equally, if not more
significantly, institutions specific to a particular scale become something to be challenged, disputed, reworked. Institutional regimes are always stakes for territorially defined interests. They work for some and not for others, or they can be transformed in order to provide an enhanced competitive advantage.

A graphic instance played out in the context of the East Asian financial crisis of the latter years of the 1990s (Wade 1996; Wade and Veneroso 1998.) Commitment to a Japanese model of economic development led to short term liquidity crises for firms and this in turn to financial shortfalls. This then led to IMF interventions which were, in effect, designed to impose a quite different model that was more congenial to American practice. American corporations had long chafed at the way in which adoption of the Japanese model made penetration of respective domestic markets more difficult, while increasing the competitive capacity of their firms in international markets. So the crisis provided a nice opportunity to do serious damage: a making of the global from the bottom-up, in other words, and an IMF which, while nominally an international organization, works to the advantage of some rather than all.

This example also underlines the way in which territory is not just defensive; it is also a base for geographic expansion and creating new spaces of circulation – new opportunities for American firms to dismantle the statist policies of countries like Thailand that had made it hard, among other things, for foreign takeovers of their banks. Geographic expansion via some strategic decentralization can be a means of protecting an existing territorial base: decanting the less skilled / de-skilled parts of the labor process elsewhere, while keeping the skilled parts which are less easy to move; in other words, a protective and selective hollowing out of part of the production process that is a form of vertical disintegration.

What this suggests is that scale and territory are always about uneven development: about protecting and enhancing some local advantage while forcing disadvantage on to others elsewhere. It is, in short, about struggles for local / regional / national hegemony in wider spaces of circulation. We can see this in current debates about London’s dominant position within Great Britain (Massey 2007.) The same occurs at metropolitan scales, where central cities in the US have been able to subordinate suburban peripheries to their purposes to quite variable degrees (Cox 2010; Cox and Jonas 1993.) As David Harvey (2000) indicated, ‘globalization discourse’ tended to overlook this sort of relationship. It also tended to encourage a view that the global was, causally, the crucial level; which brings us in turn to scale and territory as a discourse and the latter’s ideological significance.

5. SCALE AND TERRITORY AS DISCOURSE

The media, the politicians and the pundits don’t talk about scale as such, or jumping scale, or territory, but they are replete with references to ‘our country’, ‘what is good for Ohio’, ‘the challenges of globalization’, ‘federal neglect of our cities’, struggles between older and newer suburbs played out at state level, and the grim reality of having to compete with cities and regions elsewhere. So on the one hand, a rhetoric of necessity imposed from without, some alien force of a more global political economy bearing down on the more local; and on the other, one of false social unities that advances political purposes while marginalizing, even silencing, what is really at stake; what is being reproduced and who is losing from that reproduction.

The globalization literature of the 80s and even into the 90s, fed a highly spatialized imaginary of competition between countries for inward investment: rhetorics of trickle down and raising all boats, the need to make concessions to mobile capital, and to loosen labor law. The contrast with the class framings of politics of capital’s golden years of the 50s and 60s was striking. But class hadn’t been evacuated from politics. It was just assuming new forms. The shift to international currency convertibility was emblematic, as Burnham (1997) and Notermans (1993; 1997)

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2 “That so many of us took the concept (of globalization) on board so uncritically in the 1980s and 1990s, allowing it to displace the far more politically charged concepts of imperialism and neocolonialism, should give us pause. It made us weak opponents of the politics of globalization particularly as these became more and more central to everything that US foreign policy was trying to achieve.” (2000: 13)
have pointed out. The problem confronted in the early 70s was one of increasing wage demands that refused to buck a slowdown in productivity increases. The result was inflation. The external anchor provided by the adoption of convertibility that was already underway as a result of the collapse of Bretton Woods, emerged as a way of handling it. Henceforth, inflation would result in a decline in the value of the national currency as it was sold in favor of other currencies and balance of payments problems. This would result in an increase in interest rates and a slowdown in the growth rate: all to be explained by a situation outside the control of the government in question. In other words, a government could dodge responsibility, all the while disciplining labor. In such ways do scales get produced – or in this case, since there had been an earlier globalization with, in virtue of the gold standard, similar wage-repressing properties, rediscovered.

6. BOTTOM-UP? TOP-DOWN? OR IRRELEVANT?
In talking about the construction of new spaces of circulation, and therefore new scales, a dominant sense in the paper has been of a bottom-up motion. Capitals, supported by branches of the state working from the same territorial base, have expanded their markets and production spaces in a geographic sense, introducing new institutional supports as a necessary complement. Labor, in the form of the labor movement, has followed suit, trying to counter the advantages that capital’s entry into labor markets yet to be organized can provide: the goal is always to take wages out of capital’s competitive calculus through a common bargaining front (Cox 1997.) This view, of course, is in sharp contrast to common criticisms of the politics of scale literature that it assumes a hierarchy in which upper levels are dominant; though the hierarchical form could prevail if the assumption is that the creation of those higher levels inevitably results in the alienation of power from the bottom-up forces; the creation, for example, of an anarchic, out-of-control, global scale.

But this in turn poses the question of just how should one envisage the relation between scales? Critical human geography has espoused notions of relationality and it is useful to see scales as related exactly in that way: how more local scales incorporate the more global and vice versa. What it tends to stop short of, though, is a conception of relationality between particular objects that is totalizing; that relates the relationality of scales to social formations in toto (Cox 2016b.) For a case can be made that scalar relations, a particular scalar division of state labor, among other things, cannot be understood outside of their relation to the social process as a whole. Given the way in which state forms vary, even while they are all capitalist states, the comparative provides a useful entrée into this set of relations.

The US has a highly decentralized set of scalar relations. To an unusually radical federation has been added the equally radical delegation of functions from state to local governments. These have certainly been the object of struggle but the decentralizing forces have tended to prevail so that more central branches function to a marked degree as resources to be turned to local advantage. The West European case is quite other: more evidently the hierarchical form attacked by critics of the politics of scale literature. Local governments are subordinated to a body of centrally defined law and are more reliant for their funding on central government. This sense of

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3 A common view is that a decline in the value of the national currency provides a fillip to exports while reducing imports. To the degree that exports depend on production using imported raw-materials and components, this may be problematic. Domestic producers may ultimately be able to substitute for imports, but that takes time. Likewise, expanding exports does not happen immediately; among other things, the necessary distribution networks elsewhere in the world have to be set up.

4 Thus Burnham (1997) who refers to the external anchor of currency convertibility as “providing the strongest possible public justification governments can muster for maintaining downward pressure on wages to combat inflation and thereby achieving price stability” (p.154.) And “… through depoliticization and externalization, states have found a novel (but not historically unique) way in which the mythical ‘national interest’ can be brought to bear on wage settlements” (p.157.) See also Piven (1995) on globalization as ideology.
hierarchy can be a little deceiving, though, if one regards the national political parties as coalitions of locally-based class forces. In both instances, therefore, local and central branches of the state internalize one another, if in different ways. Local government is what it is in virtue of a relation to the central state. The process through which the more global and more local scales have been formed has, accordingly, been a mutual one, structures at one scale conditioning the formative strategies which are possible at another.

This relationality then has its conditions in contrasting societies: contrasting in historically sedimented institutions, in class relations and in beliefs (Cox 2016b: Chapter 8). Not least the US never had a centralizing absolutist state in its history and this created different sorts of opportunity structure for class forces and struggle over scalar relations. The fact that capitalist development started virtually on a tabula rasa in the US has also been important. In Western Europe significant pre-capitalist elements formed a background for different sorts of class alliance. Not least, labor movements found allies in elements of the ruling class absent in the US; without that configuration it seems unlikely that labor movements in Western Europe could have been as effectively centralizing as they have been, as in the formation of welfare states that are quite other than their US cousin.

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We are now in a position to reassess the claims made by the critics of scalar/territorial understandings of politics. They counter claims of hierarchical scalar relations with an emphasis on networks; on horizontality rather than verticality. But while hierarchy has to be a necessary feature of social life in a capitalist society, where deep antagonisms have to be regulated, the fact of relationality in the vertical and not merely the horizontal, puts an additional blush on matters. So much so that in the US it appears that it is the tail that wags the dog. Moreover, verticality does not exclude horizontality and nor does hierarchy exclude networks. Scalar structures and their particular institutional regimes are fought over because of their significance for uneven development and for local / regional / national hegemony in more global contexts. This in turn requires the cementing of coalitions and alliances across space to secure and to impose particular scalar compromises that will inevitably be for some and not for all.
REFERENCES

